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L’interaction entre modalité et
temps verbaux en anglais
The interaction between modality and tense in English
Renaat Declerck
1 Declerck (2006) argues at great length that the core meanings and the basic uses of the
English tenses concern the expression of temporal relations. However, it is well-known
that  certain  tenses  have  uses  that  are  at  the  same  time  temporal  and  modal  (for
example, the future tense) and that certain tenses have uses that would seem to be
purely modal rather than temporal (for example, the forms had come and wouldn’t have
found in If you had come tomorrow instead of today, you wouldn’t have found me at home). In
this article we will discuss some of these uses with a view to finding the answers to the
following questions:
(a) What is the origin of the modal interpretation of particular tense forms?
(b) Why do only some tenses have modal uses?
(c) Should we distinguish a ’modal indicative mood’ next to the ’indicative mood’, the
’imperative mood’ and the ’subjunctive mood’?
 
1. The I thought that . . . -construction
2 This construction is analysed in detail in Declerck and Reed (2005). The main findings
are the following. There are two modal uses of I thought that .  .  .  ,  namely its use to
express  ’suspended  factuality’  (implicating  present  counterfactuality)  of  the
complement clause, as in (1a), and its use to express discourse tentativeness, as in (1b).
(1)
a. [What a surprise to meet you!] I thought you were in Australia!
b. [If you don’t mind my asking,] I thought you might do me a favour.
3 In both cases thought is a normal preterite form: it locates the situation of thinking in
the  past  and  implies  that  the  referent  of  the  subject  of  thought  did  entertain  the
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of thought arise by way of implicature from the fact that the thinking is not located at
the time of speech in spite of the fact that this is the most relevant time for the speaker
(unless the sentence forms part of a discourse in the past tense). In other words, the use
of  the  past  tense  is  a  conscious  violation  of  Grice’s  (1975)  ’Maxim  of  Relation
(Relevance)’.  Because  he  does  not  use  I  think,  the  speaker  suggests  that  he  is  not
committed to the current applicability of the proposition of the complement clause.
4 In the case of suspended factuality,  as in (1a),  the motivation for the expression of
noncommitment is that the speaker wants to suggest that he is not sure whether the
content of the complement clause would be true if applied to the present world. In the
case of discourse tentativeness, as in (1b), the noncommitment is suggested because the
speaker wishes to make the content of the complement clause appear unimportant (to
himself) in the present.
5 These findings are relevant to the research questions (a)-(c)  formulated above.  The
answer to question (a) [What is the origin of the modal interpretations?] is to be found
in the conscious violation of the Gricean Maxim of Relevance by the use of the preterite
where the present tense would be the unmarked choice. The answer to question (b)
[Why do only some tenses allow modal interpretations?] is as follows. Although I have
thought would also locate my thinking before S (speech time), it could not yield the two
modal interpretations of I thought because in English there is an opposition between
’past time-sphere tenses’ and ’present time-sphere tenses’ (Declerck 2006: 152). Unlike
the past tense (preterite), the present perfect locates the time of the situation referred
to in the present time-sphere, more specifically, in the ’pre-present zone’ within the
latter, and in doing so expresses a link with the present. The preterite, by contrast,
implies  a  contrast  between  the  past  and  the  present.  This  is  the  reason  why  the
preterite has to be used in sentences like He is no longer the brilliant scientist that he {was/
*has been}. Needless to say, the modal interpretations of thought crucially depend on the
presence of a sense of contrast between past and present.
6 As to question (c) [Do we need to posit a separate ’modal indicative mood’?], the answer
is that the data in connection with I thought that . . . fail to suggest that this is necessary.
The two modal interpretations follow from the normal temporal use of the preterite,
viz.  locating  a  situation  in  the  past,  and  the  violation  of  a  Gricean  Maxim.  The
important thing is that thought is a quite normal indicative tense form. The fact that it
can produce modal interpretations does not support the view that there is a separate
’modal indicative mood’ in English.
 
2. ’Formal anteriorization’ or ’distancing’
7 By  ’formal  anteriorization’  or  ’distancing’  (or  ’modal  backshifting’)  we  mean  the
phenomenon that in certain contexts verb forms are replaced by forms that seem to
express a higher degree of ’pastness’ in order to produce a more ’distant’ (remote from
reality) interpretation. Compare the following:
(2)
a. I will be happy if Sue comes.
b. I would be happy if Sue came
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8 Sentence (2b) is the result of applying distancing to both verb forms of (2a). The result
is that the ’open’ condition (i.e. Sue may or may not come, but the speaker treats her
coming as a real possibility) expressed by if Sue comes in (2a) is turned into a condition
which is semantically ’tentative’ (Declerck & Reed 2001: 93), i.e. if Sue came expresses
that it is not impossible but rather unlikely that Sue will come. Sentence (2c) is the
result of applying distancing to both verb forms of (2b). The result is that the tentative
condition expressed by if Sue came is turned into a counterfactual one: Sue did not come
(or, if tomorrow is added, will not come).
9 It should be noted that distancing is not the same thing as ’backshifting’ (Jespersen
1932:  151) in indirect speech. Backshifing is  the adaptation of the tense form of an
independent clause when that clause is syntactically subordinated to a clause in the
past tense: the original absolute tense (as in I have seen her) is replaced by a relative
tense (as in He claimed that he had seen her). Unlike an absolute past tense form, which
simply  locates  a  situation  in  the  past,  a  relative  past  tense  form,  which  expresses
simultaneity in a past ’temporal domain’,1is never backshifted — see Declerck (2006:
384). Consider:
(3) a. [He said:] “I will be happy when she is back.” (Will be is an absolute tense form, while is 
is a relative tense form expressing simultaneity.)
b. He said that he would be happy when she was back. (Both forms are ’backshifted’ forms and
are therefore relative tense forms: would be expresses posteriority, while was expresses
simultaneity with the time of the situation referred to by would be.)
(4) a. [He said:] “I was happy until you came.” (Was is an absolute tense form, while came is a
relative one — see Declerck 2006: 155).
b. He said that he had been happy until I came. (Only the absolute form is backshifted.)
(5) a. [He said:] “I would be happy if she came.” (Both forms are distanced forms.)
b. He said that he would be happy if she came. (Neither form is backshifted because both are
distanced forms.)
(6) a. [He said:] “I would have been happy if she had come.” (Both forms are distanced forms.)
b. He said that he would have been happy if she had come. (Neither form is backshifted because
both are distanced forms.)
10 Clearly, the gradual increase in semantic ’remoteness’ ( distance from reality) which we
observe in conditionals like (2b) and (2c) is expressed by verb forms which are partly
different from those resulting from applying backshifting to the same sentences in
indirect speech: would be happy and came can become would have been happy and had
come as a result of distancing — in (2c) — but not as a result of backshifting — see (5)-
(6): (6b) is the indirect speech version, not of (5a) but of (6a). Moreover, we notice in
(5b) and (6b) that distanced forms are not backshifted in indirect speech. Furthermore,
while both absolute and relative past time-sphere tense forms can be distanced, as in
(2b) and (2c), relative past time-sphere tense forms cannot be backshifted: this is why
would be and came remain unchanged when (5a) is reported as (5b).
11 Besides conditionals like (2b)-(2c), there are other cases in which a tense form can or
must be distanced. Here we can mention the well-known uses of ’modal pasts’, which
express  either  counterfactuality  or  discourse  tentativeness,  and  of  ’modal  past
perfects’, which express a combination of anteriority and counterfactuality. A first use
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but is replaced by the past tense for reasons of discourse tentativeness (i.e. to render
the request less direct).
(7)
a. I {hoped/thought} you could help me clean up this mess.
b. I {wanted/hoped}to have a word with you.
c. I wondered if you could spare me a minute.
12 Similarly, the preterite form of verbs like expect, intend, hope, mean, suppose, want, etc.
can  be  distanced,  so  as  to  become  a  past  perfect,  in  order  to  add  the  idea  of
counterfactuality  (more  specifically,  the  implicature  of  nonactualization)  of  the
complement clause situation:
(8)
a. I {had hoped/had thought/had meant/had wanted} to see her {yesterday/today/tomorrow}.
(Implicates: ’but I {did not/do not/will not} see her’.)
b. He {had supposed/had thought/had expected}that his mother would pay his debts.
(Implicates that she did not.) 
13 After the verb wish (in any tense) and if only, a modal past expresses simultaneity plus
counterfactuality, whereas a modal past perfect expresses a combination of anteriority
and counterfactuality:
(9)
a. {If only/I wish/I wished} I had her telephone number.
b. {If only/I wish/I wished} she had given me her telephone number.
14 Similarly, if the head clause uses a present time-sphere tense, a clause introduced by as
if or as though uses a modal past to express simultaneity plus counterfactuality, and a
modal past perfect to express anteriority plus counterfactuality:
(10)
a. He {has treated/treats/will treat} me as if I was his slave.
b. People now avoid me as though I had murdered my parents.
15 In  all  these  examples,  the  modal  interpretations  of  the  verb  forms  are  due  to  the
mechanism of modal distancing, and never to the context or to an implicature (though
the modal interpretation itself may sometimes be an implicature, as in (8a-b).)
16 The above observations about distancing (formal anteriorization) are relevant to the
research questions (a)-(c) formulated at the beginning of this article. We have noticed
that distancing always results in the use of a past time-sphere tense (i.e. preterite, past
perfect, conditional tense or conditional perfect). A present perfect can never be used
as a distanced form. We have also seen that the modal interpretations of the examples
discussed  are  always  due  to  the  mechanism  of  modal  distancing  and  never  to  the
context  or  to  implicatures.  Moreover,  it  has  been  pointed  out  that  distancing  is  a
different phenomenon from backshifting. Backshifting is an adaptation of a tense when
the temporal relation to be expressed changes, and is therefore a natural mechanism in
the English tense system. By contrast, distancing has nothing to do with a change of
temporal  relation  but  has  no  other  purpose  than  to  bring  forth  some  modal
interpretation.  Verb  forms  like  would  come  can  be  distanced  (would  have  come)  but
cannot be backshifted. All this suggests that the use of formally anteriorized tenses has
nothing to do with the working of the English tense system and therefore does not
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here supporting the existence of a ’modal indicative mood’. The fact that some modal
preterite forms can be replaced by past subjunctives corroborates this conclusion:
(11)
a. I wish I {was/were} dead.
b. He treats me as if I {was/were} his slave.
c. If Bill {was/were}here, Samantha wouldn’t be here.
 
3. The notion ’not-yet-factual at t’
3.1. Definition
17 As is well-known, finite clauses express tensed propositions, and propositions create ’t-
worlds’, that is, ’possible worlds’ which are anchored to a particular time t. Thus, I will
be  in  Paris  tomorrow creates  a  future  t-world  (t  =  tomorrow) of  which the untensed
proposition ’I be in Paris’ is true. It is also generally assumed that finite clauses express
one of the epistemic values figuring on the scale ’true — probably true — possibly true —
unlikely to be true — false’. The actual world as we know it, and which we can refer to as
the ’S-objective world’ because it is temporally anchored to S (speech time), comprises
every proposition that is true at S, i.e. any proposition that represents the actualization
of a situation as ’factualat-S’.2A situation is factual-at-S if it either actualizes at S (e.g. I
am writing an article, London lies on the Thames) or has actualized before S (e.g. Caesar was
a Roman emperor). A propositions is true of some ’hypothetical’ t-world if it is probably
true, possibly true or unlikely to be true of the S-objective world. Thus, Jim may come
tonight represents  John’s  coming  as  factual  in  a  hypothetical  future  world.  A
proposition is true of a ’counterfactual’ t-world if it is false of the S-objective world.
Thus,  [If]  John had been here now .  .  . represents John’s being here as factual in a
counterfactual S-world (and hence as counterfactual in the objective S-world).
18 A clause representing a proposition as true in the objective S-world (e.g. London lies on
the Thames) is not normally treated as modal. As far as propositions are concerned,
’hypothetical’ and ’false’ are the only accepted epistemic modal values. It follows that
only a hypothetical or counterfactual situation can be the referent of a modal clause.
19 Although it is widely accepted, this view of epistemic modality is incomplete. Some
hypothetical t-worlds can be characterized in terms of a modal concept which has been
neglected in the literature on modality, viz. the idea that the relevant modal world is
envisaged by the speaker but not yet factual at the time t to which it is anchored. This
kind  of  t-world,  which  we  will  refer  to  as  ’not-yet-factual  at t’,  is  evoked  by  any
expression that has posteriority as part of its meaning. The clearest cases are those in
which the reference is to a future world. Thus, John will take the exam tomorrow evokes a
modal world which is not-yet-factual at S but is envisaged or predicted at S to become
factual at some future time t. It follows that any situation that is temporally located in
that future t-world by the future tense is ’not-yet-factual at S’.3Another type of example
is I saw Sam before she had seen me. Here the situation of the before-clause is represented
as not-yet-factual at the time of the head clause situation. The sentence can therefore
be paraphrased as ’I saw Sam at a time when she had not yet seen me’, or ’When I saw
Sam, it was not yet a fact that she had seen me’ — see section 3.2below.
20 Sentences representing the actualization of a situation as not-yet-factual in a t-world
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The latter idea implies ’envisaged as possibly actualizing at a time posterior to t’, i.e.
’envisaged as factual in a hypothetical world that might exist at a time posterior to t’.
Envisage  thus  refers  to  something  weaker  than  prediction.  It  just  means  that  the
speaker reckons with the possibility that a situation will actualize.
21 We thus claim that the factuality value ’not-yet-factual at t’  is a combination of the
values ’t-counterfactual’ and ’t-hypothetical’. Thus I will do it tomorrow implies that I
am not doing it at S and have not done it before S ( counterfactuality at S) and at the
same time predicts or envisages my doing it in a hypothetical future world anchored to
tomorrow. Since the combination of the values ’t-counterfactual’ and ’t-hypothetical’ is
different from either of the constituting values, we conclude that there are not three
but  actually  four  theoretically  possible  factuality  values,  viz.  [`  factual],  [(purely)
counterfactual], [` (purely) hypothetical] and [` not-yetfactual at t]. The latter three are
possible realizations of ’nonfactual’ ( ’not factual’). Unfortunately, this means that the
term ’nonfactual’ is potentially ambiguous. We have to distinguish carefully between
the factuality  value ’nonfactual’  (which contrasts  with ’factual’  only)  and the three
subvalues which ’nonfactual’ allows, viz. ’counterfactual’, ’hypothetical’ and ’not-yet-
factual at t’. In order to avoid confusion, it is better not to use the label ’nonfactual’ in
the sense of ’not-yet-factual at t’, as I have done in earlier publications (e.g. Declerck
1991a: 105, 1991b: 153-154) in connection with not-yet-factual before-clauses (as in I
saw him before he had seen me, which is interpreted as ’He had not yet seen me when I
saw him’ — see section 3.2below).
22 As a further illustration of the above claims, let us consider the following sentences:
(12)
a. Abraham Lincoln abolished slavery.
b. Jimmy Carter is the President of the U.S.A.
c. [I’d be surprised] if Fred was helping his sister right now.
d. Joan will bake a cake tomorrow.
e. [John promised] that he would fix the car.
23 In (12a), the actualization is factual in the objective S-world. In (12b), the actualization
is (purely) counterfactual in the objective S-world. The actualization referred to in the
if -clause of (12c) is (purely) hypothetical in the speaker’s S-world because the speaker
does  not  really  know  whether  Fred  is  helping  his  sister  or  not.  In  (12d),  the
actualization  referred  to  is  not-yet-factual  in  the  speaker’s  S-world.4And  the
actualization of the situation referred to in the that-clause of (12e) is not-yet-factual in
John’s past t-world, i.e. in the objective world holding at the time when John made his
promise.
24 It  should  be  clear  now  that  each  of  the  terms  ’factual’,  ’(purely)  counterfactual’,
’(purely) hypothetical’ and ’not-yet-factual at t’ can be used in two ways. Firstly, they
can refer to one of the factuality values which the actualization of a situation has in a
given t-world. Secondly, the four terms can also be applied to particular kinds of t-
worlds. For example, the conditional world evoked by I would feel safer if he was with me
is a subjective counterfactual S-world because the situations that are factual in this S-
world are counterfactual in the objective S-world.
25 This means that the following conclusions have been reached:
(a) There are four types of t-worlds. We can call them ’factual’, ’purely counterfactual’,
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(b) The same four labels can be used for the four (mutually exclusive) factuality values that
(the actualizations of) situations can have in given t-worlds.
(c) ’Not-yet-factual at t’ combines the ideas ’counterfactual at t’ and ’hypothetical at t’.
However, it is incompatible with the idea ’purely counterfactual at t’ as well as with the idea
’purely hypothetical at t’.
26 In sum, the factuality values that may be applicable to a given nonfactual t-world can
be represented as in figure 1.
Figure 1. —Representation of the factuality values in nonfactual t-worlds
 
3.2 Cases of situations represented as not-yet-factual at t
27 As noted above, a situation that is referred to in the future tense is typically not-yet-
factual  in  the  objective  S-world.  Similarly,  a  situation  that  is  temporally  located
posterior to a past time, as in [John promised that] he would fix the car, is not-yet-factual
in the objective world holding at that past time.
28 In certain contexts, 'not-yet-factuality at t' can be expressed by modal indicative tense
forms, more specifically by the past tense and the conditional tense. In those cases the
'pastness'  of  the  tense  cannot  be  explained  in  terms of  location  in  time or  purely
temporal relations. For instance, the preterite may refer to a future situation rather
than  to  a  past  one.  The  'pastness'  of  the  tense  must  therefore  be  due  to  modal
distancing. The following illustrate this:
(13)
a. It is (high) time we changed the code. (The situation of our changing the code is not-yet-
factual in the objective S-world: though it has not actualized yet, its actualization is
envisaged for the future.)
b. I'd rather you left next week. (similar)
c. I wish it would stop raining. (The stopping of the rain is not-yet-factual in the speaker's S-
world. Its actualization in a future world is envisaged as a possibility, however slight.)
29 In (13a-b), 'not-yet-factuality as S' is expressed by the preterite. In (13c), it has to be
expressed by the conditional tense because (as we have seen in section 2) after I wish
the preterite is reserved for the expression of S-counterfactuality. Thus, in I wish I had a
son, the situation of my having a son is represented as counterfactual in the objective S-
world.
30 Needless to say, ’formal anteriorization’ (modal distancing) is essential in examples like
It’s  high  time  we  fixed  the  car,  since  the  ’not-yet-factual  at  S’  meaning  cannot  be
expressed by *It’s high time we fix the car. In I wish John would kill his wife the expression of
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marker of posteriority (will) produces a tentative interpretation, i.e. the possibility that
John will kill his wife is seen as rather unlikely. The above sentence can be compared
with I hope John twill/*wouldu kill his wife, where the second aspect of meaning cannot be
expressed.
31 The tenses used to express not-yet-factuality in t-worlds that hold at a time other than
S (i.e. in the past or future) are the same as those used in connection with S-worlds:
(14)
a. It was (high) time we changed the code.
b. I wished it would stop raining.
c. [When we return from our holiday] it will be (high) time we changed the code.
d. Before the end of the day you will wish that it would stop raining.
32 This illustrates that, unlike backshifting, modal distancing happens independently of
the nature of the tense used in the head clause.
33 Another typical context in which a not-yet-factual meaning can be produced by modal
distancing consists of sentences involving a before-clauses in the past perfect. These can
represent the actualization of the situation referred to as not-yet-factual in the t-world
that holds at the time of (the actualization of) the head clause situation. For example:
(15)
a. I saw Sam before she had seen me.
b. [Another fifteen to twenty thousand snakes perished in the winter of 1998-9,] when a
sudden frost caught them before they had descended below the frost line. (www)
34 The actualization of the before-clause situation is represented here as not-yet-factual at
the  time of  the  actualization of  the  head clause  situation.  Thus,  in  (15a)  it  can be
paraphrased in either of the following ways:
(16)
a. I saw Sam at a time when she had not yet seen me.
b. Sam had not yet seen me when I saw her.
35 These paraphrases make it clear that the interpretation of the before-clause is neither
factual nor purely counterfactual in the past t-world in which my seeing Sam is factual.
A t-factual interpretation of the before-clause would be triggered by the past tense:
(17) I saw Sam before she saw me. (= ’We saw each other, but I saw her first.’ Note that there
is reference to two different past t-worlds here: that in which my seeing Sam is t-factual and
that in which Sam seeing me is t-factual. The latter t-world follows the former in time. This
posteriority relation is exclusively expressed by before.)
36 A purely counterfactual interpretation of the before-clause situation would be triggered
by the conditional perfect:
(18)
a. I saw Sam just before she would have seen me [if I had not quickly turned into a side street].
b. I paid the electricity bill two days before the company would have cut offmy supply. (The
conditional perfect is possible because of the implicit condition ’if I had not paid the bill’.)
37 The interpretation which had seen does receive in I saw Sam before she had seen me is a
’not-yet-factual at t’ reading: in the world anchored to the time of my seeing Sam, the
situation  of  her  seeing  me was  counterfactual  but  its  actualization  was  envisaged.
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with the possibility of her seeing me. Nothing is said about whether she also saw me or
not — see footnote 5.
38 Another case in which a not-yet-factual reading is possible concerns adverbial until-
clauses  and  before-clauses  depending on  a  finite  or  nonfinite  clause  which  itself
depends on a head clause whose verb is an intensional verb like intend, decide, promise,
etc., which implies that the actualization of the situation of the complement clause is
posterior to the time of the intensional attitude (i.e. the intention, decision, promise,
etc.). In such a context, the subjective world in which the actualization of the situation
of the temporal clause introduced by until or before is factual is posterior to the t-world
in which the making of the decision, promise, etc. is factual. Compare:
(19)
a. Meg nagged Tim until he gave in. (Both situations are interpreted as factual in the
objective S-world.)
b. Meg decided to nag Tim until he gave in. (The until-clause situation was not-yet-factual at
the time of the beginning of the nagging and the nagging itself was not-yet-factual at the
time when Meg made her decision. It follows that the until-clause situation was also notyet-
factual at the time of Meg’s decision. Note that we do not know from this sentence whether
or not Tim eventually gave in.)
c. Meg nagged Tim for three weeks before he gave in. (Both situations are represented as
factual in the objective S-world.)
d. Meg decided {to wait/that she would wait} for some time before she replied to Tim’s
letter. (The before-clause situation was not-yet-factual at the time of the beginning of the
waiting, which was itself not-yet-factual at the time when Meg made her decision. It follows
that the before-clause situation was also not-yet-factual at the time of Meg’s decision. Note
that we do not know from this sentence whether or not Meg eventually replied to Tim’s
letter.)
39 Other  temporal  clauses  depending  on  an  infinitive  clause  functioning  as  object  of
decided, promised, intended, etc. are interpreted as not-yet-factual, not in the t-world in
which  the  infinitival  clause  situation  actualizes,  but  in  the  t-world  in  which  the
decision, promise, etc. actualizes:
(20) I intended to call up Bill {when he was at home/after Meg had left/ while he was at his
office}. (The time clause situation is factual in the hypothetical t-world in which my calling
up Bill is factual, but both these situations — my calling up Bill and the time clause situation
— are not-yet-factual at the time of my intention, i.e. they are not-yet-factual in the
objective S-world in which the existence of the relevant intention is a past fact.)
40 In this example, the ’not-yet-factual at t’ interpretation is not induced by the temporal
conjunction (as is the case in I saw Sam before she had seen me — see section 3.3) but by
the relation of posteriority that is implicit in the meaning of the verb intend.
 
3.3. The origins of ’not-yet-factuality at t’ and the means of
expression
41 As noted in 3.1, ’not-yet-factuality at t’ always requires reference to a posterior time.
This is self-evident in connection with examples like John will kill you, I thought that John
would kill you and I wish John would kill you. It is also clear in It’s high time we fixed the car,
where fixing the car can only be envisaged for the future, and in I decided to tell him the
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actualization  of  the  time  clause  situation  can  only  be  interpreted  as  following  the
decision.
42 Posteriority also plays a crucial role in before-clauses. To see this clearly, it is necessary
to say something more about the temporal structure that is expressed by a sentence
involving a not-yet-factual before-clause. Let us consider the following example:
(21) I saw Tim before he had seen me.
43 The before-clause here receives a not-yet-factual interpretation: the sentence can be
paraphrased ’I saw Tim at a time when he had not yet seen me’ or ’Tim had not yet seen
me when I  saw him’.  As  explained in  Declerck  (1991b:  153-154,  2006:  709-710),  the
temporal structure of the sentence is as follows:
(a) Saw locates the situation (of my seeing Tim) in the past, thus representing it as a past
fact.
(b) Before means ’before the time that’.5This means that before locates an implicit t1posterior
to the time of saw.
(c) Since t1is posterior to the time (t) of saw, the t1-world anchored to t1is not-yet-factual
att(t = the time of saw).
(d) Had seen represents Tim’s seeing me as anterior to the implicit t1.
44 At first sight this seems a purely temporal structure, which only involves times and
temporal  relations.  The  times  are  the  times  of  the  actualizations  of  the  situations
referred to by saw and had seen,  plus the implicit time t1inherent in the meaning of
before.  The  temporal  relations  are  the  relation  expressed  by  the  preterite  (=  ’past
relative to S’) and the relation expressed by the past perfect (= ’anterior to a t in a past
temporal  domain’), plus  the  posteriority  relation  (=  ’t1posterior  to  t’)  expressed  by
before (but not by a tense form). However, there are two factors that induce the reading
that the situation of Tim’s seeing me was not yet a fact at the time when I saw him. One
is the fact that the situation of Tim’s seeing me is temporally related to an implicit
posterior time t1. The other is the fact that the tense in the before-clause is ’modally
distanced’ (’formally anteriorized’): we use had seen instead of the past tense form saw.
This  tense  choice  is  important,  because  I  saw  Tim  before  he  saw  me  is  naturally
interpreted as meaning that Tim did see me after I had seen him.6The same is true of
before-clauses referring to the future: to convey the not-yet-factual reading we will use
the present perfect (I  will  see Tim before he has seen me)  although there is no purely
temporal  reason  to  express  anteriority.  The  reason  for  using has  seen  is  that  the
unmarked interpretation of the corresponding present tense form sees in I will see Tim
before he sees me is different, viz. ’Tim will see me, but only after I have seen him first.’
We therefore need to apply modal distancing to get a not-yet-factual reading.
45 In sum, the use of a past perfect or present perfect in a before-clause that is to receive a
not-yet-factual-at-t interpretation is not the result of the application of a principle that
is  inherent  in  the  English  tense  system  (like  backshifting)  but  is  the  result  of  the
application of the principle of ’modal distancing’ (’formal anteriorization’) which has
no  other  purpose  than  to  produce  a  modal  interpretation.  In  general,  distancing
strengthens the sense of hypotheticality (compare If he comes . . . with If he came . . . ) or
expresses counterfactuality (as in If  he  had come .  .  .  ).  However,  in before-clauses it
evokes a ’not-yet-factual at t’ reading. As noted before, distancing can produce shifts
(e.g. from would be to would have been) which cannot be effected by backshifting. This






L’interaction entre modalité et temps verbaux en anglais
Cahiers de praxématique, 47 | 2006
10
in the English tense system (see also section 2above).  As noted before,  backshifting
typically occurs in indirect speech, for example, when John {died/has died} is reported as
I told Bill that John had died. This kind of backshifting is no more than the phenomenon
that  anteriority  to  a  past  orientation time has  to be expressed by the past  perfect
whereas anteriority to S has to be expressed by the past tense or the present perfect. By
contrast, the modal distancing which we observe in the before-clauses of I saw him before
he had seen me and of I will see him before he has seen me is the phenomenon that a tense
form expressing anteriority (to the implicit t inherent in the meaning of before) is used
instead of a tense form expressing simultaneity. The purpose is purely modal, in this
case to convey a ’not-yet-factual at t’ interpretation of the before clause situation. The
fact that an anteriorized form is used in not-yet-factual before-clauses is therefore not
surprising.  We noted  in  section  2that  using  an  anteriority  form where  there  is  no
purely  temporal  reason  for  using  it  is  a  widespread  device  to  trigger  particular
epistemic modal meanings. For example, instead of saying I intended to visit him, which
merely expresses that at some past time I had the intention of visiting him, we can use I
had intended to visit him to express that, in spite of my past intention, I did not and will
not visit him. Distancing here triggers a counterfactual interpretation of the situation
referred to in the infinitive clause.  As we have seen, the same mechanism can also
induce tentative modality, as in I wanted to have a word with you and I would be happy if
she arrived tomorrow, which are tentative versions of I want to have a word with you and I
will be happy if she arrives tomorrow.
 
4. ’Strong’ versus ’weak’ not-yet-factual interpretations
46 We can speak of ’strong not-yet-factuality’ if, as in the above examples, the expression
of posteriority is  accompanied by formal anteriorization of  the tense form. We can
speak  of  ’weak  not-yet-factuality’  if  there  is  posteriority  but  no  anteriorization
(distancing), as in the following examples:
(22)
a. I will visit them tomorrow. (The actualization of the situation is located in a t-world that is
posterior to the speaker’s S-world. This implies that my visit is not-yet-factual at S.)
b. John promised that he would visit me the next day. (The actualization of the situation is
located in a t-world that is posterior to the past t-world in which the making of the promise
is factual. This implies that John’s visit was not-yet-factual at the time of his promise.)
c. I decided to wait until the shop opened. (similar)
47 These examples illustrate the obvious fact that any situation whose actualization is
conceived of  as  posterior  to  a  time t  is  not  yet  factual  at t.  This  is  ’weak not-yet-
factuality’: the idea of ’not-yet-factual at t’ inevitably forms part of the interpretation of
the clause, but it is not the predominant aspect of meaning. Strong not-yet-factuality
means that the extra mechanism of modal distancing puts emphasis on the idea of not-
yet-factuality. In other words, whereas there is weak not-yet-factuality at t whenever a
situation is posterior to the t in question, there is strong not-yet-factuality only if the
’not-yet-factual at t’ meaning is linguistically emphasized by the use of an anteriorized
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a. “[We think] it’s time something’s done,” says Donald Skadden. (Wall Street Journal) (The
sentence in the present tense only expresses weak not-yet-factuality. It just means ’It is time
to do something’ — a meaning which can also be expressed by It’s time something should be
done. The idea that nothing has been done yet is not foregrounded.) 
b. It’s time something was done [about it]. (In this case strong not-yet-factuality is expressed.
The idea ’It is time to do something about it’ forms part of the interpretation, but the
foregrounded aspect of meaning is the idea that nothing has been done about it yet. The
combination of these two ideas naturally leads to the interpretation that something should
already have been done about it, i.e. that taking measures has been postponed for too long.)
48 For at  least  some speakers,  before-clauses need not use an anteriorized form if  a  t-
factual  reading  is  ruled  out  by  the  context  in  which  the  before-clause  is  used.  For
example, compare the following:
(24)
a. She read the letter before I read it.
b. She read the letter before I had read it.
c. She tore up the letter before I {had read/read}it.
49 Because of the posteriority relation expressed by before, the situation of my reading the
letter is automatically weakly not-yet-factual in the t-world in which the actualization
of  the  head  clause  situation  is  factual.  The  function  of  using  the  anteriorized
(distanced) form had read in (24b) is therefore to bring not-yet-factuality into focus,
because the use of read in (24a) suggests that I read the letter too. In the latter case the
speaker focuses  on the t-factuality  of  the before-clause situation in  the objective  S-
world rather than on the not-yet-factuality of  the situation in the anterior t-world
established by the head clause in the past tense. In (24c), the head clause pragmatically
excludes the possibility of actualization of the before-clause situation, so that the idea of
not-yet-factuality comes to the fore regardless of whether there is anteriorization or
not. This explains why at least some speakers can replace had read with read without
creating confusion.
 
4.1. Strong ’not-yet-factuality at t’ and the research questions
50 The first two research questions were: ’Why do only some tenses have modal uses?’ and
’What is the origin of a modal interpretation?’. The answers are simple. The origin of a
strong  ’not-yet-factual  at t’  interpretation  is  the  application  of  the  rule  of  formal
anteriorization  (modal  distancing).  The  possibilities  allowed  by  this  rule  are  well-
defined. As a rule, the distanced form has to be a preterite (If he came . . . ), a past perfect
(If she had come . . . ), a conditional tense form (I would be happy if . . . ) or a conditional
perfect (I would have been happy if . . . ). In other words, a distanced form is a past time-
sphere form, not a present time-sphere tense form like a present tense, a future tense,
a present perfect,7or a future perfect. So, it naturally follows from the origin of the
modal ’not-yet-factual at t’ interpretation that only some tense forms can express this
reading.
51 The third research question was whether we should distinguish a ’modal indicative
mood’ next to the ’indicative mood’, the ’imperative mood’ and the ’subjunctive mood’.
The fact that unlike backshifting, distancing is not a mechanism inherent in the English
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5. The status of the ’future tense’: tense or mood?
52 The issue is also pertinent to the moot point whether will in Bill will arrive tomorrow is a
future tense auxiliary or a modal auxiliary. Quirk et al. (1985: 213) claim that “there is
no future tense in English” and that will is a “modal verb”. The modality in question is
said to be prediction. Huddleston & Pullum (2002: 208) speak of “the lack of a future
tense in English” and claim that futurity is a use of will that falls “within the general
idea of epistemic modality” (p. 188) but they do not specify what kind of epistemic
modality is expressed in Bill will arrive tomorrow. This point of view is shared by many
other  linguists.  However,  our  position,  defended  in  Declerck  (1991a:  8-13,  2006:
102-106), is that will arrive is a future tense form because it locates Bill’s arrival in the
future. We subscribe to Lyons’ (1977: 68) and Comrie’s (1985: 9) view that tense is a
grammaticalized  means  of  locating  the  actualization  of  a  situation  in  time.
Linguistically speaking, will arrive does exactly this (viz. locate a situation in time) and
nothing else. It is therefore a future tense form.8Of course, it is true that the predicted
situation  is  not-yet-factual  at  S,  but  this  is  simply  because  any  situation  that  is
predicted to actualize later than S is not yet factual at S. This is a question of how the
objective world is rather than of how it is linguistically represented. As is true of any
tense, the function of the future tense is to represent a situation as actualizing at a
particular time. If the time in question is represented as posterior to S, the situation is
automatically not-yet-factual at S (in the weak sense of the term). There is nothing in a
future tense form to hint  at  the possibility of  strong not-yet-factuality:  there is  no
anteriorization or any other formal means of focusing attention on ’not-yet-factuality
at S’.
53 Moreover, in connection with the future tense, the idea ’not-yet-factual at S’ appears to
have the strength of an implicature only. There are sentences in the future tense in
which the idea is blocked (= prevented from arising) or cancelled by an element in the
sentence or in its context or by our pragmatic knowledge of the world. Consider:
(25)
a. I will still be here tomorrow. (Still blocks the implicature that I am not yet here at S.)
b. [For the moment you can’t beat me. You’ll be able to beat me when I’m fifty] because you 
will be ten years younger than me. (The addressee is already ten years younger than the
speaker, but it is only when the speaker becomes fifty that this difference of age will play a
decisive role. The future tense is used here to put the ’temporal focus’ (Declerck 2006:
573-576) on that future time.)
54 Similarly, the sentence John will be in London tomorrow does not rule out the possibility
that John is already in London at  S,  so that the sentence can be used in a context
inducing  this  interpretation.  However,  it  actually  only  predicates  something  of
tomorrow and locates John’s being in London at that time. It does not say anything
about the present. In the same way as John was in London yesterday implicates that John
is no longer in London at S, John will be in London tomorrow implicates that John is not yet
in  London  at  S.  These  implicatures  are  due  to  the  Gricean  Maxim  of  Relation
(relevance): other things being equal, the present is more relevant to the speaker than
the past or the future. So, if a situation is actualizing at S, it should in principle be
referred to in the present tense. If  another tense is used, the hearer has a right to
conclude  that  the  situation  is  not  actualizing  at  S.  However,  this  conclusion  is  a
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55 We have drawn attention to a number of cases in which a tense form has a modal
implication or implicature. Some of these (for example, the modal interpretations of
the object clauses of I thought that . . . ) follow naturally from the use of a mechanism
that  is  inherent  in  the  English  tense  system  (e.g.  using  the  past  tense  to  put  the
’temporal focus’ on the past rather than on the present). However, there are also cases
in which a modal interpretation, especially that of strong not-yet-factuality at t, is the
result  of  formal  anteriorization  (modal  distancing)  of  a  verb  form — a  mechanism
which has no other use and therefore does not form part of the English tense system.
We can hardly escape the conclusion that these anteriorized verb forms do not form
part of the indicative mood in English, hence that we have to assume the existence of a
separate ’modal indicative mood’ in English.
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NOTES
1. A temporal domain is a set of times which is such that each time is related to one of the other
times by a tense form. See Declerck (1991a: 20, 2006: 121) for a more detailed definition.
2.  We  use  situation as  a  cover-term  for  anything  that  can  be  expressed  by  a  verb  phrase.
According  to  Lyons  (1997),  a  situation  is  either  a  state,  an  action,  a  process  (=  change,
development) or an event (= a nonagentive dynamic situation, e.g. a fall). The term actualize is
used as a cover-term for all the verbs that are typically associated with a kind of situation. The
sentence The situation is actualizing can thus be said of a state that is holding, an action that is
being performed, a change that is taking place or an event that is happening. In what follows,
‘the  situation’  will  often  be  shorthand  for  ‘the  actualization  of  the  situation’.  Thus,  the
formulation ‘The preterite locates the situation in the past’ is short for ‘The preterite locates the
actualization of the situation referred to in the past’.
3. When referring to the future tense in this article we will  especially be concerned with its
modal implication. This does not alter the fact that we treat the future tense as a real tense — see
noteF731on page 62.
4. It should be noted, however, that not all sentences in the future tense yield a ’not-yet-factual
at S’  interpretation.  As we will  see in section 4,  this reading is  an implicature which can be
blocked by another constituent of the sentence (as in I will still be here tomorrow) or cancelled
by contextual information or by pragmatic knowledge.
5. The conjunction before has developed from a phrase of  the form ’before the time that’  or
’before then that’, variously realized in Old English as toforan þam timan þe, foran to þam timan þe
and toforan þam þe — see Mitchell (1987: 379). The reduction to before that in Middle English, and
later to before, has not changed this meaning. Before still means ’before the time that’, in which
the time functions as an implicit orientation time as far as the use of the tense in the before-clause
is concerned. That is, in I saw Tim before he had seen me, the form had seen represents Tim’s seeing
me as anterior to an implicit tF7
31
,  thus locating it in the tF7
31
-world which is not-yet-factual at t.
Hence the not-yet-factual interpretation of the before-clause, which is vague as to the question
whether or not Tim saw me after I saw him. This vagueness can be resolved by the context, as in I
saw Tim before he had seen me, so I called out his name versus I saw Tim before he had seen me, so I had
time to hide into a porch because I didn’t want him to see me.
6.  However, it will be pointed out at the end of section 3.4that at least for some speakers the
tense of the before-clause does not need to be ’anteriorized’ if a t-factual reading is already ruled
out by the context in which the before-clause is used. An illustration of this is He burned the letter
before I read it.
7. As we have seen, there is only one exception to this rule, viz. the use of the present perfect
(rather than the present tense) in the not-yet-factual before-clauses of sentences like I will try to
see him before he has seen me.
8. Declerck (2006: 105-106) argues that the ’predictability’ sense of That will be the milkman (which
is similar to French Ce sera le laitier) follows from the fact that the speaker uses the future tense to
put the ’temporal focus’ on some future time: “That’ll be the milkman implies something like ’as
you will see when you open the door’.” This means that will be is a normal future tense form
which is used in accordance with one of the principles inherent in the English tense system, viz.
that the choice of tense can be determined by the choice of ’temporal focus’.
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RÉSUMÉS
Cet article se veut une réflexion sur des emplois particuliers de temps verbaux qui engendrent
une  interprétation  modale.  L’auteur  explique  deux  mécanismes  qui  sont  à  la  base  de
l’interprétation modale et de ce fait indique les raisons pour lesquelles ces implications modales
sont uniquement associées à  certaines formes verbales.  Il  défend l’hypothèse que le  premier
mécanisme, un choix marqué de ’temporal focus’, est aussi utilisé différemment dans le système
verbal en anglais, ce qui implique que la forme verbale en question est tout d’abord un indicatif.
Mais  le  deuxième  mécanisme,  appelé  « modal  distancing »,  ne  fait  pas  partie  intégrante  du
système verbal en anglais. Ce constat implique qu’en anglais, il est nécessaire de distinguer un
’mode  indicatif  modal’  à  coté  du  mode  indicatif.  L’analyse  proposée  permet  à  l’auteur  de
souligner l’importance d’un type de modalité épistémique qui est souvent négligé, à savoir l’idée
que la situation n’est pas encore réalisée au moment du repère. 
This article examines a number of cases in which the special use of a tense form produces a
modal interpretation. The author describes two mechanisms leading to such an interpretation
and in doing so explains why only some tenses can yield modal readings. He argues that the first
mechanism (viz. a marked choice of ’temporal focus’) is also used in other ways in the English
tense system, so that the resulting tense forms are normal indicative forms. However, the second
mechanism  (called  ’modal  distancing’)  dœs  not  form  part  of  the  English  tense  system.  This
supports the view that next to the indicative mood we also need to posit a ’modal indicative
mood’ in English. One of the interesting features of the article is that it draws attention to an
epistemic modal value that is  usually neglected,  namely the idea that a situation is ’not-yet-
factual at t’. 
INDEX
Mots-clés : anglais, distanciation modale, focalisation temporelle, modalité, mode indicatif
modal, not-yet-factual at time t, temps




K.U. Leuven Campus Kortrijk E. Sabbelaan 53, B-Kortrijk 8500, Belgium
renaat.declerck@kuleuven-kortrijk.be
L’interaction entre modalité et temps verbaux en anglais
Cahiers de praxématique, 47 | 2006
16
